[Großer]

"Einsatz von Vista ist derzeit noch hoch riskant"

Vista ist momentan nicht zu gebrauchen - zu diesem Ergebnis ist die britische Regierungsbehörde für Informations- und Kommunikationstechnolgie gelangt.
Die BECTA (British Educational Communications and Technology Agency) rät dringend von einem zu schnellen Umstieg auf Windows Vista in Schulen und Bildungsbehörden ab. Microsoft sollte einige konkrete Beispiele für erfolgreiche Umstiegsstrategien zeigen, um darzustellen, worin die Vorteile von Windows Vista liegen und was ein Umstieg kostet.

Vollständiger Artikel und Quelle

[Großer]

Wenn ich dich richtig verstehe glaubst Du das W2K und XP schlechter wegkommen als Vista.
W2K und XP sind inzwischen ausgereift - Vista möchte da noch hinkommen.

[Großer]

Oha, der Kernel-Schutz ist noch nie wirklich unter reellen Bedingungen getestet worden und Vista wurde schon mit mit 500 bekannten Fehlern ausgeliefert. Und Du willst mir erzählen das der Kernel-Schutz alles fett macht und Vista ausgereifter als W2K oder XP ist?! Selbst XP war ohne das SP1 kaum zu gebrauchen.

@MCDX
Niemand hast Vista, es mag es nur nicht jeder - was eigentlich jedem verständlich sein sollte, außer er lässt sich von der GUI und DX10 blenden.

Dieser Beitrag wurde von Großer bearbeitet: 13. Januar 2007 - 15:35

[Großer]

UAC wurde nur abgeguckt und dann noch falsch umgesetzt. Die Abfrage ist so oft, das viele User sie bestimmt abschalten werden weil sie einafch nur nervt.

Es sind 500 bekannte Bugs.

Du hast es selbst gepostet:

Zitat

there are no “must have” features in the product

[DekenFrost]

Wie war das doch gleich ?

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/technetma...hs/default.aspx

Zitat

Myth: You Should Wait Before Deploying an OS or Service Pack

We constantly hear organizations arguing that they cannot deploy a particular piece of software. They usually have valid reasons to hold off upgrading, such as the cost, the training requirements, or a hardware refresh. However, we also hear a lot of not-so-valid reasons, particularly just about any reason based on perceived security requirements. There are two common myths surrounding OS upgrades. The first myth is that you should wait to deploy the new OS or service pack because it will have a lot of bugs that should be fixed, so you should let someone else find those bugs first.

It should be obvious why this argument is flawed: exactly who is going to find all those bugs if everyone follows this advice? There are other problems with the argument too. For example, it is often supported by stories of problems with Windows NT® 4.0 Service Pack 2 (SP2). While it is true that there were stability issues with that service pack, software testing has progressed significantly in the 10 years since it was released. It is not too likely that the same problems plaguing that release would ever recur.

Furthermore, the vast majority of problems with OS and service pack releases occur because of custom applications and for two general reasons: either those apps are broken already and security implementations in the new OS simply highlight the flaws, or the apps hit some obscure bug in the OS that would not be encountered without the app. In the former case, the problem is the app, and it should be replaced, not retained. In the latter case, it is even more important that you start testing the service pack or OS as soon as you can, preferably in the beta period before it is released! It is much simpler to get a problem fixed before the OS or service pack is released than afterward.

It�s impossible to foresee all the combinations that will reduce security and stability. Only by having customers partnering with the software vendor and participating in the beta program can we ensure that the software is as stable and secure as possible.

The second OS myth is that your deployment must wait until you have a defined security configuration standard or you will put your network at risk. The fact is that new OS releases are much more secure out of the box than the ones of yesteryear even with the most stringent guidelines implemented.

The threat models and assumptions to which the older operating systems were designed are no longer valid. For example, Windows® 2000 was designed to a threat model that was valid in 1997, and the Windows NT 4.0 threat model was valid in 1993. In 1997, microsoft.com had just migrated from a server underneath someone�s desk to a datacenter. In 1993, gopher was the protocol of choice for transporting information across the Internet. The World Wide Web had just been invented, NetBEUI was considered a state-of-the-art protocol, and OS/2 reigned as the industrial-strength operating system of savvy corporations.

There is no comparing the security fundamentals of those operating systems to Windows XP SP2 and Windows Server� 2003 SP1, which were developed under the Security Development Lifecycle and against a threat model that was valid as we entered 2004. The threats, the mitigations, the very nature of how we do business has transformed in ways we could not have imagined, even in 1997.

Quite the opposite of the common view (that we put the network at risk when we upgrade without a security configuration standard) is that we put the network at risk when we fail to upgrade to an OS designed to a valid and current threat model.

[Stan]

hm großer so langsam gehen mir deine MS-Flame-News auf die Nerven...

[mici]

Zitat (Stan: 13.01.2007, 16:15)

hm großer so langsam gehen mir deine MS-Flame-News auf die Nerven...

Kann ich nur zustimmen!

[DekenFrost]

stop stop stop .. jetzt übertreibt mal nicht.

Auch wenn einem so eine news nicht gefällt es ist immernoch eine News und beleidigen tun wir uns hier schon garnicht.